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The plan laid out in this very thoughtful and readable paper envisions a transition in 
the secondary mortgage market away from dependence on government guarantees 
and toward primary reliance on private capital. Although the plan is broadly similar 
to several other proposals put forward, the various proposals differ in important 
respects, such as how to structure and price any remaining federal credit guarantees, 
how to structure and regulate the secondary market, and whether and how to support 
affordable housing.1 This plan, which builds on the author’s earlier work with 
Donald Marron, takes a pragmatic approach to reducing reliance on government 
guarantees while recognizing the difficulties of credibly eliminating all government 
support from the secondary mortgage market. 
Specifically, the paper begins by enumerating a set of goals for the reform 
and goes on to describe a plan for achieving them. Those goals include supporting 
home ownership, protecting taxpayers, protecting the financial system and the 
economy against systemic risk, clarifying the roles of the private and public sector, 
fostering competition and innovation, providing continued public support for 
affordable housing, and arriving at a housing system that will be stable over time. 
The key elements of the proposed reform are a secondary government backstop on 
conforming MBSs, entry and competition in the securitization of conforming MBSs, 
a gradual increase over time in the price of government insurance and a decrease in 
its coverage, the use of part of the insurance premiums to fund affordable housing 
activities, and the sale of Fannie and Freddie to the private sector. 
An important theme running through the paper is that even though a 
consensus has not yet been reached on the ultimate role of the government in the 
secondary mortgage market, the first steps toward a smaller government presence 
will be the same no matter what end point is eventually decided on, and that starting 
to move down that path sooner rather than later is both feasible and desirable. In 
this discussion I will elaborate on some of the important elements of the proposal, 
explain why changes to budgetary accounting for mortgage guarantees should be 
part of the reform, and also comment on some aspects of the proposal that seem 
problematic.
Pricing of Government Guarantees
Many of the problems inherent in the pre-crisis system arguably have their roots 
in the underpricing of government guarantees. In particular, the implicit federal 
guarantee of the obligations of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (and other preferences 
granted in their charters) gave them a significant advantage over potential 
competitors. Those  advantages allowed those government-sponsored enterprises 
(GSEs) to dominate the segments of the secondary mortgage market in which they 
1 See Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 2010 for an overview of those proposals and a more 
detailed discussion of. alternative approaches and the tradeoffs between them
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were allowed to operate; in turn, their size and dominance made them a significant 
source of systemic risk for the financial market and broader economy. 
The chronic underpricing of government guarantees and the distortions 
thereby created is one of the strongest arguments for bringing private risk capital 
back into the secondary mortgage market. A critical element of the author’s plan 
involves increasing the price of government guarantees gradually over time, and 
starting that process immediately. Increasing guarantee fees is a prerequisite 
for reviving the private securitization market sooner rather than later. It is also 
important for increasing the transparency of the remaining housing subsidies and 
discouraging excessive risk-taking by borrowers, lenders, and the government: and 
for increasing the transparency of remaining housing subsidies. Of course more 
accurate pricing would not eliminate the risk of future bailouts, but it could lower 
their probability and reduce distortions in the allocation of capital between housing 
and other productive uses.
In recent years over 85 percent of new mortgage originations have been 
federally backed, either by Fannie and Freddie, or by fully federal agencies such as 
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). To make it possible for private entities 
to compete in the conforming market will require some combination of increases in 
GSE guarantee fees and reductions in loan size limits on conforming mortgages.2,3 
Although there is considerable uncertainty about how much guarantee fees would 
need to be increased to attract private capital to the market, an advantage to initiating 
a gradual fee increase is that it would reveal the private supply curve. A gradual 
increase also would allow policymakers to limit the impact of higher fees on the still-
weak housing market. Lowering the conforming limit, which could be done together 
with a fee increase or as a stand-alone policy, would also force more borrowers to 
rely on private capital. However, the limits would have to be reduced dramatically 
before a sizeable fraction of mortgages would become ineligible for GSE purchase.4 
Furthermore, decreasing the conforming limit without simultaneously increasing 
guarantee fees could result in significant price discrepancies above and below the 
conforming limit, which could erode support for the reform. 
2 To get market signals about prices the proposal includes the start up of an auction process for 
federal backstop guarantees while Fannie and Freddie are still federal entities and the main channel 
of funding for conforming mortgages. How the cost of those purchases would be paid for seems 
tricky, and it would be worthwhile for the author to more fully explain how that transition would 
work under this plan.
3 Some commentators also have emphasized regulatory and legal uncertainties as impediments to 
a re-emergence of private sector securitization. However, the below-market pricing of government 
guarantees would crowd out private participation even if the other impediments currently limiting 
entry by competitors were addressed.
4 Currently the loan limit in most areas is $417,000 but the median residential mortgage is about 
$170,000.
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The author emphasizes both the difficulty of preventing the government 
from underpricing its guarantees, and that bringing in private capital is the best 
way to make sure that taxpayers are compensated for bearing risk and are protected 
from risk. He also observes that assessing some fee for a backstop guarantee would 
be better than giving it away for free. I agree on all counts. However, the proposal 
neglects to mention an important impediment to any effort to address underpricing: 
the current budgetary treatment of federal credit programs. Budgetary estimates 
are generally taken to be the best available cost measures in policy discussions. 
For most credit programs, however, budgetary estimates of cost are systematically 
lower than market values because there is no charge included for the risk transferred 
to taxpayers. If the government were to adopt a market (or fair) value approach 
to calculating the cost of its credit obligations, the cost of the risk transferred to 
taxpayers would be more apparent to policymakers and the public, perhaps making 
it more palatable to charge higher fees.5 The current budgetary accounting for Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac is particularly problematic. Although the GSEs are in federal 
conservatorship and controlled by the government, they are accounted for by the 
executive branch as if they were nongovernmental; the President’s budget only 
shows a cost when the Treasury infuses the GSEs with cash. Under that accounting 
rule, if the GSEs were to increase their fees to the point where private financial 
institutions would find it attractive to enter the conforming mortgage market, 
Fannie and Freddie would soon look like major profit centers for the government, 
which could become a further impediment to their privatization.6 
Housing Subsidies
The proposal calls for continued federal support for affordable housing through the 
FHA or some other fully federal agency. Existing mandates on the GSEs to support 
affordable housing—which a number of studies have found to be fairly ineffective 
and poorly targeted—would be eliminated. Instead, subsidies for affordable housing 
would be funded with the guarantee fees collected on the backstop insurance sold 
by the government to private securitizers of conforming mortgages. (The proposal 
does not elaborate on the design of future affordable housing programs.)
Replacing mandates on the GSEs and other financial institutions with 
subsidies funded through the budget process would be a significant step towards 
5 As described in CBO (2010), most federal credit programs are accounted for under the Federal 
Credit Reform Act of 1990, which proscribes the use of Treasury rates for calculating the net present 
value of the expected cash flows associated with a direct loan or loan guarantee. By contrast, fair 
value estimates reflect that investors discount expected loan cash flows at interest rates that are 
higher than Treasury rates. 
6 The CBO accounts for the GSEs differently than does the executive branch. It uses a fair value 
basis of accounting, which has the effect of aligning budget costs with economic costs. On a fair 
value basis, for example, sales of MBSs at market prices are budget neutral.
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increasing the transparency of housing subsidies and legislative control over them. 
However, the specific suggestion of funding housing subsidies with income from 
the guarantee fees is essentially a budget gimmick that would tend to obscure the 
economics of the situation. After all, if the backstop guarantees were fairly priced 
then the income generated would just cover the cost of the guarantees; no surplus 
would be created from which to fund other government activities. In the more likely 
case that the guarantees would be underpriced, they would represent a cost to the 
government, not a source of available revenue.7 
A further caution is that moving affordable housing subsidies onto the budget 
without modifying the way they are accounted for would not make the subsidies 
transparent, and it could slow the transition to a less government-dominated market. 
As the paper notes, an undesirable feature of the pre-crisis system was that the 
government provided implicit guarantees at no cost to the GSEs. A perverse feature 
of the current system is that the FHA provides explicit mortgage guarantees at 
below-market prices and shows budgetary profits from doing so because of the 
way guarantees are accounted for. The FHA currently guarantees more than 17 
percent of residential mortgage originations. It provides guarantees to borrowers 
who tend to be less creditworthy than conforming borrowers, and FHA-insured 
mortgages have loan-to-value ratios as high as 97 percent. Despite the risks 
involved, a history of higher-than-expected loss rates, and below-market pricing, 
FHA mortgage guarantees reduced the reported budget deficit by about $4.4 billion 
in 2012 (CBO 2011). By contrast, the Congressional Budget Office estimates that 
on a fair value basis those same guarantees would have a subsidy cost of $3.5 
billion. If the GSEs were directed by their regulator to increase their guarantee fees 
as called for under this plan, and FHA pricing were to remain at current levels, some 
borrowers who currently opt for a conforming mortgage would switch to the FHA. 
The favorable budgetary treatment of the FHA is a disincentive for policymakers 
to limit guarantee volume or to raise fees in that program. Hence making housing 
subsidies “explicit, on budget, and subject to a vote of Congress” as proposed in the 
paper is an important goal, but probably insufficient to create transparency without 
also instituting accounting reforms that recognize the full cost of credit guarantees.
Market Structure
A critical design issue for proposals such as this one, which combines private and 
government capital, is the number and types of private intermediaries that would be 
permitted to purchase the federal guarantees. Proposals range from licensing a small 
number of highly regulated private entities—often referred to as “the public utility 
7 More generally, from the perspective of a unified budget it is not meaningful to earmark 
revenues for specific purposes.
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model”—to allowing any private financial institution that met certain regulatory 
criteria to participate—a “big tent” model. 
The author favors the big tent model, which I think has several features 
that would make it more economically and politically robust than a public utility 
approach. Importantly, the credit risk of conforming mortgages would be widely 
spread across diversified institutions, which could reduce systemic risk relative to 
both the pre-crisis model and the public utility model. A moderately large shock to 
house prices could create distress for a monoline housing guarantor (or for many 
smaller monoline guarantors), but it would be less likely to threaten the capital 
reserves of well-diversified financial institutions. Diversification could thereby 
prevent moderately large house price shocks from becoming systemic shocks 
requiring government intervention. Opponents of the big tent model rightly note 
that opening the federally backstopped securitization market to diversified financial 
institutions creates the risk that losses from their other activities will impede their 
ability to participate in the mortgage market, which could pose additional risks to 
taxpayers. However, such risks could be mitigated by the capital and other eligibility 
requirements for firms purchasing backstop insurance.
Regulatory capture is another concern that would probably be less of a 
problem under the big tent model. Under the public utility approach, there is the 
risk that specialized housing regulators may become more responsive to the goals 
of the regulated securitization firms or to housing interests than to the interests of 
the general public. Although large financial institutions and their regulators also are 
susceptible to political influences, bank regulators probably would be less likely 
than a specialized entity to favor housing over other interests. 
A further advantage of the big tent approach is that it would foster competition 
in guarantee pricing, which could help ensure that the benefits of federal support 
would be passed through to mortgage borrowers rather than retained by the 
stakeholders of financial intermediaries. In addition, a structure that encourages 
greater integration between the markets for private-label and federally backed 
MBSs could promote operational efficiencies, foster innovation, and encourage a 
more rapid re-emergence of the private-label securitization market.
As the author notes, a concern about the big tent model is that it may not 
create a level playing field for smaller mortgage originators. The costs to securitizers 
of working with smaller originators probably are higher than for larger entities, 
which in a competitive market would leave smaller players facing higher prices to 
securitize their loans. If policymakers want to prevent that outcome, one possibility 
would be to encourage the Federal Home Loan Banks (which are in many ways 
are similar to the public utilities envisioned by some proposals) to serve as a low-
cost entry point for small originators, as some of those banks have done in a more 
limited way in the past.
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Supported Mortgage Products
Mortgage products that qualify for federal backing tend to be popular, and hence 
the government’s backstop guarantees could be used to encourage greater reliance 
on product types that meet the needs of borrowers and that foster a stable mortgage 
market. Because it is doubtful that the 30-year fixed-rate mortgage is the best 
contractual arrangement for achieving those goals, I was disappointed that the 
paper took the continuing availability of 30-year mortgages at a “reasonable” cost to 
borrowers as a prominent goal of the reform. As the author mentions, a government 
guarantee is likely to be necessary to ensure the broad availability of 30-year fixed 
rate mortgages, which remain a popular choice in this country. However, foreign 
experience suggests that 30-year mortgages would be less attractive to borrowers 
if they were not as heavily subsidized, and that high rates of homeownership are 
achievable without heavy reliance on that product. 
From a borrower perspective, a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage offers people 
who plan to stay in their current residence for many years the prospect of predictable 
payments and the opportunity to refinance if interest rates fall. However, from an 
investor perspective a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage without prepayment penalties 
is an exotic derivative security that exposes them to considerable interest rate and 
prepayment risk. Mistakes in pricing and hedging mortgage risk contributed to the 
savings and loan crisis of the 1980s and led to the near insolvency of Fannie Mae 
around the same time. Financial products that are extremely unsafe for investors 
are generally not a good deal for borrowers. To compensate investors for the risks, 
30-year fixed-rate mortgages bear higher interest rates and are more susceptible to 
disruptions in supply than are mortgages that are easier for investors to evaluate 
and price. For homebuyers who expect to move in a few years, taking out a 30-
year fixed-rate mortgage involves paying (in the form of a higher interest rate) for 
protection against possible future rate increases, which is not needed. Furthermore, 
it is complicated for homeowners to figure out when to exercise their prepayment 
option. Because mortgages are priced to reflect average refinancing efficiency, more-
educated households that can use the option to greater advantage are effectively 
cross-subsidized by less-efficient borrowers who pay more for the option than it is 
worth to them.  
Such concerns suggest that there is an unresolved tension between the stated 
goals of continued federal support for 30-year mortgages and of moving to a mostly 
private and unsubsidized system. An alternative to accepting continued federal 
support for the 30-year mortgage as inevitable would be to use the transition to a 
new model as an opportunity to phase out federal subsidies for 30-year mortgages, 
and more generally to reconsider the types of mortgages that should be given the 
advantage of eligibility for federal backstop guarantees. 
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